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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the current paper is to investigate the possible relationship between 
fiscal discipline and social capital in EU member states during the last economic 
crisis and recovery, along with the assessment of the initial welfare effects of fiscal 
stimulus measures. Preliminary results show that institutional trust and general trust 
as social capital indicators associate positively with the extent of fiscal stimulus, 
while governance indicators show negative correlations. However, the significance 
of these results is relatively low and the subject needs thus further investigation. 
Further,  it  appeared  that  fiscal  stimulus  had  weak  positive  effect  on  short-term 
recovery of GDP and employment, but not on medium-term GDP growth potential. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent economic crisis and following government aid stimulus packages has lead 
most of the European economies into situation where budget deficit is increasing, 
and so do government debt. Many of these changes in the government’s budget 
deficit occur automatically in response to a fluctuating economy. On the side of 
budget revenues, economic recession means lower incomes and profits, so people 
and  businesses  pay  less  in  income  taxes.  Falling  incomes  mean  also  lower 
consumption expenditures and respectively decline in turnover taxes and excises. 
Lower demand and following bankruptcies mean that fewer people are employed, so 
payroll tax revenue also declines. At the same time, government spending tends to 
rise  because  more  people  become  eligible  for  government  assistance  through 
unemployment  and  welfare  insurance.  All  these  developments  lead  to  natural 
increase in budget deficit.  Then the question arises whether governments should 
reduce  occurred  deficit  by  strict  policy  measures,  or  should  they  accept 
accumulating  public  debt.  These  alternatives  and  economic  mechanisms  behind 
them  are  discussed  in  the  broad-based  literature  of  Keynesian  multiplier  and  its 
short-term and long-term welfare effects (see next subchapter). 
 
Theoretically, it is not necessarily required to keep budget balance during economic 
recession. Instead, cyclically balanced budget seems to be a good alternative, at least 
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for the stable and trustworthy states. However, in Europe this argumentation holds 
more for Western European Economies, but not so much for Central and Eastern 
European  states  which  still  have  to  prove  their  economic  stability  and 
trustworthiness.  If  we  look  at  the  real  policies  adopted  by  different  European 
countries, we can see that “old democracies” mostly encouraged private spending by 
government aid stimulus packages by increasing government spending, while new 
EU member states  mostly had budget cuts and/or increasing taxes. The question 
arises whether such policy choices were somehow determined by the readiness of 
population to tolerate the decline in living standards as a “free-market” result of 
economic crisis. It could be argued that in Central and Eastern Europe, it was much 
easier to adopt strict policies because people are still used to sustain lower living 
standards if this is necessary “price” for their independence, while people in Western 
Europe  take  their  economic  and  national  freedom  elementary  and  require 
governments to take more care for their personal welfare.  
 
Among other factors, government’s ability to avoid increasing budget deficit during 
the economic recession might also depend on the level of social capital in the society 
in general and on the level of public and institutional trust more specifically. The 
purpose of the current paper is to investigate the possible relationship between fiscal 
discipline and social capital in EU member states during the last economic crisis, 
along  with  the  assessment  of  the  welfare  effects  of  fiscal  stimulus  packages. 
Empirical data of budget balance and economic performance are taken from Eurostat 
and  data  of  social  capital  (including  measures  of  general  and  institutional  trust, 
satisfaction  with  government,  and  the  impact  of  last  recession)  from  European 
Social Survey rounds 3-5. Methodologically, simple bivariate comparisons of fiscal 
balance and social capital indicators (and their changes during economic crisis) will 
be performed.  
 
Rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  into  four  sections.  In  Section  2,  theoretical 
background  about  short-run  fiscal  stimulus  and  their  possible  long-run 
macroeconomic effects are introduced. In Section 3, a short overview of the fiscal 
policy  measures  implemented  by  European  countries  is  given,  followed  by  the 
preliminary statistics of actual and expected macroeconomic outcomes. Section 4 
presents the analysis of the possible relations between social capital and crisis policy 
in different countries, while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
As a reaction to the global financial and economic crisis,  most of the European 
economies  have  adopted  extensive  fiscal  stimulus packages in order  to underpin 
aggregate demand and to avoid increase in unemployment. This section attempts to 
highlight basic theoretical background and expected outcomes of such expansionary 
fiscal policy, taking also into account the real context of European economies. 
 
The argument about the effectiveness of fiscal policy has roots in the Keynesian 
model which predicts that expansionary fiscal policy boosts disposable income and 
raises private consumption. These beneficial but mostly short-run results comprise 146 
multiplier  effect  due  to  actions  taken  by  private  sector  after  the  initial  fiscal 
expansion. The term „fiscal multiplier“ can be broadly defined as the ratio of the 
change in GDP to the change in the size of fiscal instrument (Freedman et al 2009, 
p.5).  Most  of  the  modern  literature  that  analyses  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy  on 
economic activity has focused on the size and sensitivity of fiscal multipliers, as 
these factors determine the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus packages (Coenen et al 
2012). However, the idea of Keynesian multiplier
3 has received also a lot of critics. 
One source of criticism was the fact that Keynes’ theory was short run, but in reality 
it takes time for multiplier process to be completed (Asimakopulos 1986). Another 
criticism  (e.g.  Moore  1988,  1994)  rests  on  the  necessary  accounting  equality 
between investment and saving, and the rejection of equilibrium analysis. Regarding 
responses  to  the  criticism,  several  attempts  have  made  to  deepen  the  standard 
explanations of the multiplier. Recently, Gechert (2012) has extended the model of 
fiscal multiplier both in terms of a credit-money framework and in terms of a time 
dimension, making it applicable to time series data. This approach is unique in the 
sense  that  multiplier  effects  are  calculated  via  determination  of  the  behavioral 
parameters, not traditionally via identification of public spending and GDP effects 
(ibid). 
 
Besides of the expected positive short-run effects of the expansionary fiscal policy, 
theoretical literature underlines the dominance of negative crowding out effects in 
the medium term. Fiscal expansion might crowd out private spending in several 
ways, but the main basis of all these indirect effects are changes in both real and 
nominal interest rates (Mankiw 2009, p. 293). Higher interest rates which are due to 
decreased domestic savings would discourage investment and encourage capital to 
flow in from abroad. This relieves the shortage of investment resources, but induces 
also appreciation of local currency, leading thus to lower competitiveness in world 
markets. Additionally, Agnello et al (2011) have cited to the several studies (e.g. 
Feldstein 1982; Giavazzi and Pagano 1990) which suggest that fiscal contractions 
can be “expansionary” as a result of the improvement in household and business 
confidence,  so  that  cutting  budget  deficits  could  stimulate  the  economy.  More 
precisely, the underlying idea is that a permanent reduction of government spending 
may lead to an increase in output and consumption, because agents will expect an 
increase of future income due to the cut of future taxation. 
 
Concerning  the  long-term  effects  of  fiscal  stimulus,  the  smaller  national  saving 
means a  smaller  capital  stock  and  greater  foreign  debt.  According  to  the  Solow 
growth  model,  with  lower  national  savings  the  national  output  would  be  also 
smaller. However, overall effect of the current fiscal stimulus, taking into account 
both short-run and long-run changes, is hard to judge. On the one hand, current 
generations would benefit from higher consumption and material well-being, but the 
inflation tends also to be higher. On the other hand, future generations would bear 
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much of the burden of deficit – they have to pay higher taxes when government 
starts to repay loans. In today’s circumstances, the issue is further complicated by 
long-term fiscal pressures related to aging population and related increase in health 
care costs in many European countries.  
 
Empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy  on  economic  activity  is  also 
varied. Based on the empirical literature on short-run fiscal multipliers, Freedman et 
al (2009, pp.3-4) provides three policy conclusions concerning the effect and size of 
multiplier.  First,  there  is  a  general  statement  that  temporary  expansionary  fiscal 
actions can be highly effective despite of possible crowding out effects, given that 
monetary policy is accommodative. Second, the authors stress that the effects of the 
fiscal expansion are magnified if it involves multiple countries. Third, the size of the 
fiscal  multiplier  tends  to  depend  on  the  type  of  fiscal  instrument  used,  with 
expenditure measures having larger effects than others. It has been also shown that 
multiplier  would  be  smaller  in  case  of  small  open  economies  (where  is  higher 
leakages into imports) and in countries with higher savings rate. (ibid) Agnello et al 
(2011) have assessed the impact of fiscal policy discretion on economic activity in 
the short and medium-term, using a panel of 132 countries from 1960 to 2008 They 
found that fiscal policy discretion provides a net stimulus to the economy in the 
short-run,  but  crowding-out  effects  take  over  in  the  long-run,  in  line  with  the 
concerns about long-term debt sustainability. More recently, Coenen et al (2012) 
have  estimated  that  discretionary  fiscal  measures  have  increased  annualized 
quarterly real GDP growth in Euro area by up to 1.6 percentage points over the 
period 2007-2010.  
 
Form the above discussion it can be still concluded that if the short-run benefits of 
fiscal  expansion  exceed  the  possible  long-run  costs,  then  there  is  no  economic 
reason to keep balanced budget during the economic crisis. However, depending on 
the circumstances, the costs could be higher than benefits, or a country could have 
other (also non-economic) arguments for balanced budget. For example, countries 
should take into account the fiscal space available and the credibility of the fiscal 
authorities, among other considerations (Freedman et al 2009, p.3). The fiscal space
4 
can  be  shortly  defined  as the  countries’ “ability  to  temporarily  run  fiscal  deficit 
without  jeopardizing  the  sustainability  of  their  public  finances  or  their  external 
positions” (European Commission 2009, p.67). In European context it is remarkable 
that Western European countries with relatively smaller fiscal space have adopted 
more extensive fiscal stimulus packages than Eastern European countries. On the 
other hand, this in line with evidence that although emerging economies might have 
larger fiscal space, their governments’ ability to adopt fiscal stimulus is constrained 
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due  to  limited  credit  access,  pro-cyclical  spending  bias  and  small  automatic 
stabilizers (IMF 2009b).   
 
In situations where fiscal stimulus is – objectively or subjectively – impossible or 
not  desirable,  it  is  important  to  analyze  the  factors  which  support  or  inhibit 
achieving strict fiscal objectives. Author suggests that social capital could be one of 
these  factors.  Social  capital,  in  its  broadest  sense,  refers  to  internal  social  and 
cultural coherence of society, the trust, norms and values that govern interactions 
among people, and the networks and institutions in which they are embedded. (Parts 
2010). More specifically, one can distinguish between micro-level social capital and 
macro-level social capital. Micro-level social capital consists of general trust and 
civic  engagement.  Macro-level  or  aggregate  social  capital,  which  seems  more 
relevant  concept  in  the  context  of  the  current  paper,  is  considered  mostly  as  a 
collective resource and public good, which  yields the community or nation as a 
whole through democratisation, higher effectiveness of the governance and faster 
economic growth (Putnam et al 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995).
5 It can be measured, 
for example, by aggregate indicators of institutional trust and governance.  
 
Regarding trust as main component of social capital, one should distinguish between 
trust in people (general trust) and trust in institutions. It has shown that different 
types of trust can influence economic performance through several macro -political 
channels (Knack 1999). Empirical evidence shows that social capital can strengthen 
democratic governance (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1999), increase the 
efficiency and honesty of public administration (Putnam 1993, Knack 2002), and 
improve the quality of economic policies (Easterly and Levine 1997). All these 
outcomes are related to be tter governance, which in turn is expected to foster 
economic  reforms  and  development.  As  such,  trust  can  be  considered  as  a 
supplement  to  formal  institution.  On the  other hand,  social  capital  could  also 
substitute formal institutions in the situation where the latter are not well developed, 
and there is also a possibility that social capital weakens formal institutions. Based 
on that, it could be suggested that there is a certain optimal governance structure for 
each society at each phase of development  – however, it is very difficult if not 
impossible to formulate this ex ante. 
 
In the situation of economic recession where welfare losses need to be addressed by 
public  authorities,  a  priory  higher  level  of  social  capital  might  support  different 
policies  depending  on  the  public  expectations  and  preferences.  Therefore,  and 
because of the lack of earlier writings in similar topic, it is not possible to pose clear 
propositions  for  the  future  empirical  research.  Instead,  exploratory  approach  is 
adopted in order to clarify possible relationships between the level of social capital 
and fiscal policy measures to overcome economic crisis. 
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2. Data and methodology 
 
Following empirical analysis covers 27 EU member states.
6 Indicators of fiscal and 
economic development are taken from Eurostat and cover the period 2007 -2010. 
These indicators include general government fiscal balance as a proxy for the size of 
implemented fiscal stimulus, general government debt as a result of the deterioration 
in fiscal balance, real GDP a ctual present and estimated future growth rates and 
unemployment rate. In most cases, changes in these indicators over the period 2007-
2010 are observed and compared. Exact description of the economic indicators and 
measurement  details  are  given  in  Appendix  1,  while  country  values  of  these 
indicators are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Macro-level  social  capital  is  approximated  by  six  governance  indicators  from 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, referring also to years 2007-2010. Individual-
level data about micro-level social capital were obtained from the European Social 
Survey (ESS) round 3-5 and cover the years 2006, 2008 and 2010. Altogether, 22 
initial  social  capital  indicators  were  extracted  on  the  basis  of  theoretical 
considerations  and  data  availability.  Further,  exploratory  factor  analysis  was 
implemented in order to reduce the number of dimensions. As a result, three distinct 
factors of social capital were formed, named as institutional trust, general trust, and 
satisfaction  with  government.  While  two  first-mentioned  factors  were  easy  to 
interpret and they correspond quite strictly to the similar concepts widely used in 
social capital literature, the content of the last factor was more mixed. Besides the 
satisfaction of the present state of economy and satisfaction with life as a whole, this 
factor includes also person’s subjective self-placement on political left-right scale 
and expectation whether government should reduce income differences or not. So 
the third factor could be interpreted more broadly as satisfaction with government’s 
activities  in  improving  economic  welfare.  In  addition,  ESS  round  5  enabled  to 
extract two social capital factors related to households’ assessment of the effect of 
economic recession on household subsistence level and job security. Description of 
all initial indicators, details of factor analysis and country mean values of different 
social capital components (factors) can be found in Appendixes 3-7. In order to 
assure comparability between economic and social capital measures, the change in 
the  level  of  social  capital  over  the  period  2006/2007-2010  was  calculated  (see 
Appendix 8). 
 
Following empirical analysis addresses basically two research questions: 
1)  Is there any relationship between (the size of the) adopted fiscal stimulus 
packages and social capital measures? 
2)  Which are the macroeconomic outcomes of fiscal stimulus packages so far? 
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3. Fiscal stimulus and their economic effects 
 
Similarly to the global economy, also European economy has recently been hit with 
deflationary shocks associated with declined aggregate demand, which is mainly the 
result of the decreasing output and incomes, but also the result of the loss of private 
sector confidence due to ongoing financial crisis (see Decressin and Lacton 2009, 
c.f. Freedman et al. 2009, p.2). On the side of monetary policy, central banks have 
reduced interest rates in order to underpin private and aggregate demand, but these 
measures were not sufficient. Thus, further attention has turned to fiscal policy.  
 
Most  European  nations  have  followed  Keynesian  policy,  implementing  different 
combinations of government spending and tax cuts in order to replace some of the 
demand  lost  during  a  recession.  The  size  of  European  Economic  Recovery 
Programme (EERP), as endorsed by the European Council in December 2008, was 
estimated to total almost 2% of European GDP over 2009-2010
7. Table 1 brings out 
the size of the planned EU fiscal stimulus packages announced for 2009 -2010, 
divided  into  three  categories:  tax  cuts,  infrastructure  investments  an d  other 
measures.  
 
Table 1. EU planned fiscal stimulus packages for 2009-2010 (% of GDP) 
  2009  2010 
Tax cuts  0.3  0.3 
Infrastructure  0.4  0.0 
Other  0.2  0.4 
Total  0.9  0.7 
Source: Freedman et al 2009, p. 14. 
 
According to estimates of European Commission (2009, pp.68-69), in most of the 
EU countries the size of the fiscal stimulus packages has been in line with their 
fiscal  space.  However,  as  an  exception  several  Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries  have  adopted  comparatively  small  (or  none  at  all)  fiscal  stimulus 
programmes. Reasons might be different. For example, in case of Estonia the need 
to fulfil Maastricht criteria in order to adopt euro should be noticed.  
 
As a result of implemented fiscal stimulus packages, the overall deterioration in the 
government balance of EU countries amounted over 5 percentage points (5.7 %-
points in EU27 and 5.5 %-points in Euro area). Following the increase in current 
fiscal imbalances, the general government debt of EU27 (which has been around 
60% of GDP during 2000s) jumped up to 75% in 2009 and 80% in 2010 (respective 
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implement  fiscal  stimulus  measures  equal  to  2%  of  their  GDP  to  help  offset  the  global 
contraction (see Freedman et al 2009). The European Commission recommended in 2008 that 
member nations' stimulus plans amount to at least 1.2% of GDP. 151 
approximate figures for Euro area are 70%, 80% and 85%). (Eurostat 2012, author’s 
calculations)  
 
Nation-level changes in fiscal balance are illustrated in Figure 1, where countries are 
ranked  according  to  the  size  of  the  deterioration  in  fiscal  position,  measured  in 
percentage points relative to GDP. It can be seen that there is no clear regularity 
indicating that countries having larger budget deficit in the beginning of the period 
have implemented more loose fiscal policy, or vice versa. For example, Hungary and 
Malta  have  smallest  decline  in  fiscal  balance  (situation  in  Hungary  has  even 
improved) despite of the relatively high deficit in 2007 (respectively -5.1% and -
2.4%). On the other hand, Denmark and Finland had solid fiscal surplus in 2007 
(respectively 4.8% and 5.3%), which turned into large deficit (-7.4% and -7.8%) in 
2010. In the latter case, of course, one can assume the cyclically balanced budget 
policy. 
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Figure 1. Change in fiscal positions in EU countries, 2007-2010 (author’s figure 
based on Eurostat data). 
 
Extensive stimulus packages traditionally serve two main purposes: to restore GDP 
growth and thus also decrease unemployment. The benefits of the EERP programme 
were estimated to contribute about ¾ percentage points of real GDP growth in 2009 
and  about  1/3  percentage  points  in  2010.  (European  Commission  2009,  p.67). 
Author’s calculations show weak positive relationship between the proxy for fiscal 
stimulus and real GDP growth rate in the beginning of recovery (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Change in fiscal balance and real GDP growth (Eurostat 2012, author’s 
calculations). 
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Figure 3. Change in fiscal balance and medium-term growth potential (Eurostat 
2012, author’s calculations). 
 
However, when removing Ireland as an outlier (having much higher change in fiscal 
deficit than other countries) from the analysis, the Pearson correlation coefficient 
drops from 0.24 to as low as 0.07. Also, calculations show no strong connection 153 
between  change  in  fiscal  balance  and  medium-term  GDP  growth  potential  (see 
Figure 3, R
2=0.08). The same holds for the relationship between fiscal stimulus and 
change in unemployment (Figure 4). Although unemployment rate increased in most 
countries  (except  Germany)  during  the  observed  period  and  the  increase  in 
unemployment was lower in countries which implemented more extensive stimulus 
packages, the correlation coefficient (R
2=-0.29) remained relatively low. 
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Figure 4. Change in fiscal balance as compared to the change in unemployment 
(Eurostat 2012, author’s calculations). 
 
As an expected result, decrease in fiscal balance is strongly associated with increase 
in government debt during 2007-2010 (R
2=-0.75; without Ireland R
2=-0.36). Higher 
government debt, in turn, associates negatively with both present (2008-2010) and 
projected future real GDP growth (R
2 without Ireland were respectively -0.44 and -
0.38). A bit more surprising is negative correlation between present and future GDP 
growth (R
2=-0.27). On the other hand, it could be explained by the fact that fast 
growth comes from new member states which experienced also highest drop in GDP 
growth during the recession. On the basis of Figure 5 it can be also suggested that 
when omitting Baltic states as possible outliers, correlation coefficient turns positive 
(R
2=0.54).  These  results  are  consistent  with  European  Commission’s  similar 
calculations covering longer period 1999-2013 (European Commission 2009, p.32). 
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Figure 5. Actual real GDP cumulative growth and medium-term growth potential 
(Eurostat 2012, author’s calculations). 
 
As  a  conclusion  it  should  be  said  that  until  now  there  is  no  very  strong  and 
statistically significant connection between the size of the adopted fiscal stimulus 
measures (using change in fiscal balance as a proxy) and indicators of economic 
performance during the recovery. One could believe that longer time series and more 
in-depth (and country-specific) analysis are needed to further clarify this research 
question.  However,  these  preliminary  results  support  previous  theoretical  and 
empirical suggestions (e.g. Agnello et al 2011, Coenen et al 2012) that the possible 
positive effects of fiscal stimulus measures are rather short-term. 
 
4. Relations between social capital and fiscal stimulus: empirical insight 
 
In previous sections it was shown that Western European countries mostly increased 
government spending and debt as a reaction to the crisis, while new member states 
(especially  Baltic  States)  instead  had  budget  cuts  and/or  increasing  taxes.  This 
section addresses basically the question, whether there is any relationship between 
the  size  of  the  adopted  fiscal  stimulus  packages  and  different  social  capital 
measures. Theoretically, it could be suggested that in CEE countries it was much 
easier to adopt strict policies because people are still used to sustain lower living 
standards (as an inevitable “price” for their independence), while people in Western 
Europe  take  their  economic  and  national  freedom  elementary  and  require 
governments to take more care for their personal welfare.  
 
Figures 6-8 illustrate the relationship between change in fiscal balance over 2007-
2010 and concurrent changes in micro-level social capital over the period 2008-
2010. Additional information is given in Table 2, including correlation coefficients 155 
with and without Ireland (which can be considered as an outlier due to extremely 
high fiscal deficit).  
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Figure 6. Changes in fiscal balance and institutional trust (author’s calculations). 
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Figure 7. Changes in fiscal balance and general trust (author’s calculations). 
 
From  Figures 6-8  and  Table 2 it  can  be  concluded  that  larger  fiscal  deficit  and 
concurrent  lower  decrease  in  living  standards  has  slightly  stimulated  both 
institutional  and  general  trust  in  European  countries,  while  satisfaction  with 
government shows positive correlation with fiscal deficit only if Ireland (with its 
extremely  high  deficit)  is  not  taken  into  account.  Further,  there  is  no  strong  or 156 
significant correlation between fiscal balance, household subsistence and perception 
of job security during recession (these calculations are not shown for the reason of 
space).  
 
Table 2. Correlations between fiscal balance and micro-level social capital 
  Fiscal balance  Institutional 
trust 
General trust  Satisfaction 
Fiscal balance  1       
Institutional 
trust 
0.15 (0.61)  1     
General trust  0.35 (-0.30)  -0.39 (-0.35)  1   
Satisfaction  -0.07 (0.59)  0.61 (0.26)  -0.24 (0.26)  1 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients without Ireland in the parenthesis 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 8. Changes in fiscal balance and satisfaction with government (author’s 
calculations). 
 
As  regards  macro-level  social  capital  which  was  measured  by  six  governance 
indicators, the correlations with fiscal balance were mostly negative and relatively 
low.  Strongest  negative  correlation  appeared  with  “rule  of  law”  (R
2=-0.45)  and 
“voice and accountability” (R
2=-0.31). 
 
Summing  up,  the  comparison  of  the  changes  in  social  capital  and  economic 
performance during the recession and in the beginning of the recovery does not 
enable to draw very strict conclusions about the role of social capital in the context 157 
of business cycles in Europe. Probably longer time series and country-level in-depth 
analysis are needed in future research. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The  purpose  of  the  current  paper  was  to  investigate  the  possible  relationship 
between  fiscal  discipline  and  social  capital  in  EU  member  states during  the  last 
economic crisis and recovery. This topic was partly motivated by the fact that most 
of  the  old  member  states  implemented  extensive  fiscal  stimulus  packages  as  a 
measure to overcome recession, resulting in increasing public debt. Such policies are 
based on Keynesian theory about demand-driven economy: it is believed that in the 
short-run higher consumer spending would raise the aggregate demand and thus also 
equilibrium output and employment. Further, initial fiscal expansion is expected to 
“multiply”  due  to  further  actions  taken  by  private  sector.  On  the  other  hand, 
expansionary  fiscal actions can lead to increases in long-term real interest rates, 
which tend to offset the stimulus effects of the short-run fiscal actions on GDP. In 
this respect, it is important to follow long-run fiscal discipline, sustainability and 
credibility of the fiscal authorities. 
 
As  opposed  to  Western  European  countries  that  followed  Keynesian  fiscal 
expansion policies, new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (especially 
from Baltics) rather tried to keep fiscal discipline, despite of their relative high fiscal 
space related to lower initial debt burden. This raises the question  whether such 
differences  in  policy  choices  were  somehow  determined  by  the  readiness  of 
population to tolerate the decline in living standards as a “free-market” result of 
economic crisis. It could be argued that in Central and Eastern Europe, it was much 
easier to adopt strict policies because people are still used to sustain lower living 
standards if this is necessary “price” for their independence, while people in Western 
Europe  take  their  economic  and  national  freedom  elementary  and  require 
governments to take more care for their personal welfare. In this respect, the role of 
social capital might be tricky: it could be that in Western European welfare states 
higher state stimulus associate with higher/increasing social capital (especially with 
institutional trust), while in CEE an opposite strict fiscal policy leads to higher social 
capital. 
 
More  specifically,  empirical  part  of  the  paper  addressed  two  basic  research 
questions:  (1)  is  there  any  relationship  between  the  size  of  the  adopted  fiscal 
stimulus  packages  and  social  capital  measures,  and  (2)  which  are  the 
macroeconomic outcomes of fiscal stimulus packages so far?  
 
Based on data comparisons it could be said that until now there is no very strong and 
statistically significant connection between the size of the adopted fiscal stimulus 
measures (using change in fiscal balance as a proxy) and indicators of economic 
performance during the recovery. In more detail, preliminary calculations showed 
weak positive effect of fiscal stimulus on GDP recovery and employment over the 
period 2007-2010, but not on medium-term (2011-2013) GDP growth potential.  
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As regards the connection between fiscal stimulus and social capital, larger fiscal 
deficit and concurrent lower decrease in living standards has slightly stimulated both 
institutional  and  general  trust  in  European  countries,  while  satisfaction  with 
government shows positive correlation with fiscal deficit only if Ireland (with its 
extremely high deficit) is not taken into account. However, there is no strong or 
significant correlation between fiscal balance, household subsistence and perception 
of job security during recession. In case of macro-level social capital which was 
measured by six governance indicators, the correlations with fiscal balance were 
mostly negative and relatively low.  
 
In further research, it is definitely necessary to split the scope of the current paper 
into deeper separate analysis of the two sub-topics. More precisely, while the short-
run  welfare  effects  of  fiscal  stimulus  measures  during  economic  recession  have 
attained greater attention, medium term effects need to be taken under consideration 
when longer time series become available. Author’s specific interest is to deepen the 
analysis  of  the  differences  in  fiscal  stimulus  effects  in  advanced  and  emerging 
economies which might stem from the differences in initial economic, social and 
political conditions. 
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Appendix 2. Indicators of economic performance in EU countries 
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Austria  -3.5  11.6  -0.2  5.8  -3.8  6.1  0,0  5.6 
Belgium  -3.8  12.1  0.4  4.7  -2.8  5.1  0.8  7.2 
Bulgaria  -4.3  -0.9  0.6  7.7  -5.5  5.7  3.3  21.0 
Czech 
Republic  -4.1  9.7  0.9  4.3  -4.7  7.4  2,0  8.6 
Cyprus  -8.8  2.7  2.7  2.1  -1.9  3.0  2.3  7.6 
Denmark  -7.4  16.2  -5.3  4.4  -5.8  7.1  3.6  7.3 
Estonia  -2.2  3.0  -15.6  15.9  -14.3  16.6  12.2  15.5 
Finland  -7.8  13.1  -4.7  6.3  -8.4  12.1  1.5  7.6 
France  -4.4  18.1  -1.3  3.6  -2.7  4.2  1.4  5.2 
Germany  -4.5  18.0  -0.5  5.4  -5.1  8.8  -1.6  4.3 
Greece  -4.1  37.5  -6.9  -7.5  -3.3  -0.2  4.3  11.3 
Hungary  0.9  14.3  -4.7  3.3  -6.8  8.1  3.8  17.4 
Ireland  -31.4  67.7  -10.2  4.6  -7,0  6.6  9.1  -0.2 
Italy  -3,0  15.3  -4.8  1.3  -5.1  6.6  2.3  6.3 
Latvia  -7.9  35.7  -20.7  11.4  -17.7  17.4  12.7  20.6 
Lithuania  -6,0  21.2  -11.1  13.9  -14.8  16.2  13.5  18.8 
Luxembourg  -4.8  12.4  -2.0  5.0  -5.3  8.0  0.4  7.4 
Malta  -1.2  6.9  4.5  5.5  -2.6  5.5  0.4  9.1 
Netherlands  -5.3  17.6  -0.1  3.6  -3.5  5.2  0.9  4.3 
Poland  -5.9  9.9  10.9  9.6  1.6  2.3  0,0  11.7 
Portugal  -6.7  25.0  -1.5  -3.8  -2.9  4.3  3.1  3.3 
Romania  -4,0  18.2  -1.4  7.4  -6.6  5.0  0.9  23.3 
Slovakia  -5.9  11.4  4.9  7.0  -4.9  9.1  3.3  6.0 
Slovenia  -5.8  15.7  -3.4  3.6  -8,0  9.4  2.4  9.2 
Spain  -11.2  24.8  -2.9  2.8  -3.7  3.6  11.8  6.4 
Sweden  -3.4  -0.5  -0.5  7.7  -5.2  10.8  2.3  7.6 
United 
Kingdom  -7.6  35.5  -3.5  3.0  -4.4  6.5  2.5  9.8 
 
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations.162 
Appendix 3. Results of the exploratory factor analysis, ESS Rounds 1-4 
 
Initial indicator 
Component 
Institutional 
trust 
General 
trust 
Satisfaction with 
government 
Trust in politicians  0.847  0.185   0.065 
Trust in political parties  0.840  0.180   0.058 
Trust in country's parliament  0.824  0.174   0.082 
Trust in the legal system  0.730  0.226   0.062 
Trust in the European Parliament  0.718  0.010    -0.093 
How satisfied with the national 
government 
0.671  0.130  0.371 
How satisfied with the way 
democracy works in country 
0.646  0.189  0.364 
Trust in the police  0.611  0.250   0.075 
How satisfied with present state 
of economy in country 
0.514  0.267  0.483 
Most people try to take 
advantage of you, or try to be fair 
0.167  0.818   0.047 
Most people can be trusted or 
you can't be too careful 
0.221  0.786   0.060 
Most of the time people helpful 
or mostly looking out for 
themselves 
0.169  0.770   0.052 
Government should reduce 
differences in income levels 
 0.023   0.086  0.650 
Placement on left right scale   -0.004  -0.103  0.634 
How satisfied with life as a 
whole 
0.247  0.375  0.478 
% of Variance 
32.153  15.820  10.643 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Notes: KMO=0.902, cumulative variance explained 58.6% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of ESS rounds 1-4. 163 
Appendix 4. Results of the exploratory factor analysis, ESS Round 5  
 
 
Component 
Institutional 
trust 
General 
trust 
Satisfaction with 
government 
Trust in politicians  0.867  0.179  0.128 
Trust in political parties  0.858  0.176  0.102 
Trust in country's parliament  0.832  0.203  0.153 
Trust in the European Parliament  0.758   0.054  -0.054  
Trust in the legal system  0.727  0.323  0.120 
How satisfied with the national 
government 
0.618  0.113  0.485 
Trust in the police  0.607  0.342   0.091 
How satisfied with the way 
democracy works in country 
0.594  0.260  0.431 
Most people try to take 
advantage of you, or try to be 
fair 
0.188  0.792   0.031 
Most people can be trusted or 
you can't be too careful 
0.234  0.778   0.057 
Most of the time people helpful 
or mostly looking out for 
themselves 
0.176  0.755   0.059 
Placement on left right scale   0.005  -0.120  0.682 
Government should reduce 
differences in income levels 
 0.063  0.103  0.609 
How satisfied with present state 
of economy in country 
0.480  0.314  0.505 
How satisfied with life as a 
whole 
0.184  0.448  0.458 
% of Variance explained  31.832  16.899  12.028 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Notes: KMO=0.913, cumulative variance explained 60.8% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of ESS round 5. 164 
Appendix 5. Country means of social capital components, ESS rounds 3-5 
 
Country  Institutional trust  General trust 
Satisfaction with 
government 
ESS round  3  4  5  3  4  5  3  4  5 
Austria  0.03      0.23      0.25     
Belgium  0.26  0.06  0.13  -0.02  0.10  0.07  0.14  -0.09  0.01 
Bulgaria  -0.71  -0.89  -0.32  -0.46  -0.63  -0.84  -0.69  -0.52  -0.39 
Switzerland  0.49  0.48  0.57  0.39  0.34  0.30  0.39  0.30  0.52 
Czech 
Republic    -0.54  -0.31    -0.12  -0.25    0.28  0.05 
Cyprus  0.68  0.63    -0.56  -0.43    0.20  0.04   
Germany  -0.17  -0.01  -0.02  0.15  0.17  0.16  -0.10  -0.13  -0.01 
Denmark  0.73  0.68  0.51  0.79  0.77  0.80  0.76  0.55  0.37 
Estonia  0.11  -0.13  0.14  0.04  0.14  0.20  0.12  -0.14  -0.04 
Spain  0.19  0.06  -0.15  0.01  -0.03  0.09  -0.05  -0.21  -0.38 
Finland  0.66  0.65  0.50  0.56  0.51  0.57  0.36  0.23  0.25 
France  -0.15  -0.08  -0.03  -0.03  -0.07  -0.15  -0.35  -0.47  -0.43 
United 
Kingdom  -0.32  -0.29  -0.11  0.41  0.35  0.30  0.33  -0.04  0.09 
Greece     -0.31      -0.68      -0.51   
Hungary  -0.35  -0.77  0.09  -0.27  -0.22  -0.40  -0.62  -0.57  -0.20 
Ireland  0.16  -0.34    0.28  0.49    0.35  -0.34   
Netherlands  0.39  0.44  0.52  0.28  0.31  0.32  0.37  0.29  0.32 
Poland  -0.53  -0.45  -0.17  -0.33  -0.30  -0.31  0.13  0.37  0.28 
Portugal  -0.19  -0.28  -0.35  -0.41  -0.33  -0.38  -0.42  -0.47  -0.55 
Sweden  0.31  0.35  0.64  0.61  0.61  0.50  0.25  0.11  0.46 
Slovenia  -0.06  -0.01  -0.38  -0.25  -0.14  -0.23  -0.06  -0.23  -0.40 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of ESS data. 
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Appendix 6. Components of household performance during recession 
 
Initial indicators  
Component 
Household 
subsistence 
during recession 
Job security 
during recession 
To what extent had to draw on 
savings/debt to cover ordinary 
living expenses last 3 years 
0.863  -0.081 
To what extent had to cut back 
on holidays or household 
equipment last 3 years 
0.855  -0.077 
To what extent had to manage 
on lower household income 
last 3 years 
0.845  -0.163 
Had less security in job, last 3 
years 
-0.139  0.707 
Had to take a reduction in pay, 
last 3 years 
-0.198  0.703 
Had to work shorter hours, last 
3 years 
-0.049  0.661 
Had to do less interesting 
work, last 3 years 
0.005  0.571 
% of variance explained  32.14  25.68 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Notes: N=17998, cumulative variance explained 57.82% 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of ESS round 5. 166 
Appendix 7. Indicators of governance and household performance during recession 
 
Country  Household 
subsistence 
Job 
security 
Governance  
VA  PS  GE  RQ  RL  CC 
Austria      2.4  -6.5  0.5  -2.8  -2.8  -3.8 
Belgium  -.34  .14  -0.4  0.5  1.6  -5.2  -0.4  0.6 
Bulgaria  .38  .03  -5.7  -1.2  2.6  1.9  1.4  -0.2 
Czech 
Republic  .29  .02  -2.6  -0.1  2.3  3.2  3.1  2.5 
Cyprus      2.6  -6.4  2.1  2.6  2.6  -0.7 
Denmark  -.65  -.12  1.5  -1.7  -1  0.5  -1.4  0 
Estonia  .16  -.67  2.1  0.1  2.2  1.1  -0.8  0.3 
Finland  -.25  -.11  -0.4  -5.7  1.9  5.8  1.4  -1.4 
France  .16  .22  -1.8  6.4  0.2  0.2  0.5  -2.7 
Germany  -.25  .00  -1.8  -9.1  -1.3  0.1  -1.4  1.1 
Greece      -2  -23.4  -4.4  -4  -6.9  -10 
Hungary  .35  -.07  -7.8  -0.9  -5.9  -4.1  -4.5  -6.8 
Ireland      -3.3  -7.9  -4.6  -3.8  -0.9  -0.4 
Italy      -8.8  0.3  3.8  -1.2  1.4  -4.7 
Latvia      -2.4  -4.1  2.8  -0.7  1.7  -1.4 
Lithuania      -0.1  -6.6  -0.6  -3.1  5  7.7 
Malta      -2.2  -4.6  -1.2  5.5  -1.4  -3.6 
Netherlands  -.49  -.03  -3.8  6.1  -0.4  0.5  1.5  0.5 
Poland  .05  .09  8.4  14.7  6.2  7.1  7  9.6 
Portugal  .09  .16  -5.6  -3.3  3.6  -8.4  0.6  0.7 
Romania      1  3.3  5.1  7.2  4.2  -0.8 
Slovakia      -3  4.1  -0.2  -1.2  3.7  -3.4 
Slovenia  .22  .28  -5.5  -11.5  1.2  1.8  4  -5.5 
Spain  .10  -.16  0.7  0.3  -1.2  -2.2  2.5  -0.7 
Sweden  -.54  -.08  1  -7.5  0.5  2.5  1.4  1.4 
United 
Kingdom  .12  -.10  -0.9  -5.9  -0.4  -1.9  1.5  -2.7 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of ESS round 5 (2010) and Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 2012. 
 
VA – voice and accountability  PS – political stability 
GE – government effectiveness  RQ – regulatory quality 
RL – rule of law      CC – control of corruption 167 
Appendix 8. Change in social capital during the recovery from recession 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
Change in social capital, 
2008-2010 (rounds 4-5) 
Change in social capital, 
2006-2008 (rounds 3-4) 
Change in social capital, 
2006-2010 (rounds 3-5) 
Institu-
tional 
trust 
General 
trust 
Satis-
faction  
Institu-
tional 
trust 
General 
trust 
Satis-
faction 
Institu-
tional 
trust 
General 
trust 
Satis-
faction 
AT  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.035  -0.230  -0.251  -0.035  -0.230  -0.251 
BE  0.072  -0.027  0.103  -0.200  0.119  -0.234  -0.128  0.092  -0.132 
BG  0.570  -0.209  0.128  -0.178  -0.171  0.166  0.392  -0.380  0.295 
CZ  0.233  -0.124  -0.233  -0.544  -0.124  0.283  -0.311  -0.247  0.050 
CY  -0.631  0.425  -0.041  -0.047  0.137  -0.161  -0.678  0.563  -0.202 
DK  -0.164  0.028  -0.177  -0.053  -0.018  -0.214  -0.216  0.010  -0.391 
EE  0.277  0.058  0.106  -0.246  0.102  -0.265  0.032  0.160  -0.159 
FI  -0.146  0.060  0.013  -0.007  -0.055  -0.129  -0.153  0.005  -0.115 
FR  0.057  -0.080  0.032  0.065  -0.039  -0.114  0.122  -0.119  -0.082 
DE  -0.010  -0.007  0.119  0.153  0.015  -0.028  0.143  0.009  0.091 
EL  0.307  0.677  0.510  -0.307  -0.677  -0.510  0.000  0.000  0.000 
HU  0.867  -0.178  0.368  -0.425  0.052  0.048  0.442  -0.126  0.416 
IE  0.344  -0.490  0.341  -0.508  0.209  -0.688  -0.163  -0.280  -0.347 
NL  0.077  0.003  0.029  0.052  0.037  -0.077  0.129  0.040  -0.047 
PL  0.283  -0.004  -0.090  0.080  0.022  0.244  0.363  0.018  0.154 
PT  -0.074  -0.049  -0.080  -0.094  0.080  -0.052  -0.169  0.032  -0.132 
SI  -0.368  -0.086  -0.170  0.051  0.111  -0.169  -0.317  0.025  -0.339 
ES  -0.210  0.121  -0.167  -0.131  -0.039  -0.165  -0.341  0.082  -0.332 
SE  0.294  -0.108  0.347  0.035  0.004  -0.132  0.330  -0.104  0.215 
UK  0.179  -0.055  0.135  0.022  -0.055  -0.372  0.201  -0.110  -0.237 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of ESS rounds 3-5. 
 EELARVEDISTSIPLIIN, SOTSIAALKAPITAL JA 
MAJANDUSKRIISIST TAASTUMINE EUROOPA LIIDU RIIKIDES 
 
Eve Parts 
Tartu Ülikool 
 
Sissejuhatus 
 
2007.a. alanud majandus- ja finantskriis pani riikide majandused raskesse olukorda – 
eelkõige kannatas erasektor, kuid väheneva käibe ja kasumite ning kasvanud 
tööpuuduse tingimustes vähenesid ka valitsussektori maksutulud, samal  ajal kui 
vajadus sotsiaaltoetuste järele kasvas. Olukorra leevendamiseks rakendasid enamiku 
Euroopa Liidu vanade liikmesriikide valitsused ulatuslikke majandusstiimulite 
pakette, samal ajal kui Kesk-  ja Ida-Euroopa taustaga uued liikmesriigid olid 
valdavalt ettevaatlikumad (eriti Balti riigid) ning püüdsid pigem eelarvet tasakaalus 
hoida. Siit tuleneb küsimus erinevate poliitikate rakendamise põhjustest. Ühelt poolt 
soovid: on loomulik, et inimesed ei lepi kergesti elatustaseme langusega, isegi kui 
sellel  on objektiivsed ja paratamatud põhjused. Teiselt poolt võimalused: ilmselt 
poleks (vähemalt alguses) Lääne-Euroopas olnud võimalik heaoluga harjunud 
inimestele selgeks teha kärbete möödapääsmatust, samas kui Ida-Euroopas ollakse 
leplikumad elatustaseme languse suhtes – juhul, kui see on riikliku iseseisvuse ja 
turumajanduse toimimise „hinnaks“. Eeltoodu põhjal võib oletada, et kriisi ajal 
langetatud majanduslike otsuste taga on ka sotsiaalsed ja poliitilised tegurid. Üheks 
nendest teguritest võib olla sotsiaalkapital, eriti institutsionaalse usalduse tase ja 
valitsemiskorralduse kvaliteet. 
 
Käesoleva uurimuse eesmärgiks on selgitada võimalikke seoseid sotsiaalkapitali 
taseme, fiskaaldistsipliini ja majanduslangusest taastumise edukuse vahel Euroopa 
Liidu riikides. Konkreetsed uurimisküsimused jagunevad kaheks:  
1) Kas valitsuste rakendatud abipaketid on kuidagi seotud sotsiaalkapitali 
tasemega, eriti institutsionaalse usaldusega? 
2) Kas abipaketid on taganud (majanduskasvu, hõive) kiirema taastumise kriisist?  
 
Teoreetiline raamistik 
 
Euroopa riikide poolt rakendatud fiskaalsed toetuspaketid (otsetoetused erasektorile, 
laenude kättesaadavuse soodustamine intresside alandamise kaudu, valitsuse 
täiendavad investeeringud infrastruktuuri ja ekspordi toetamiseks, jne) põhinevad 
Keinsistlikul majanduskäsitlusel, mille kohaselt aitab kogunõudluse stimuleerimine 
kaasa lühiperioodi majanduskasvu ja hõive taastumisele nii otseselt kui ka kaudselt, 
multiplikaatori efekti kaudu. Fiskaalsete stiimulite negatiivseks kaasnähuks on aga 
(enamasti) kasvav riigivõlg, sest majanduslanguse tingimustes maksutulud 
kahanevad ning lisaressursid majanduse turgutamiseks tuleb laenata. Üldiselt on 
aktsepteeritav nn. tsükliliselt tasakaalustatud eelarve järgimine, mille puhul valitsus 
headel aegadel säästab osa maksutulust, mida saab kasutada ootamatu 
majanduslanguse korral kulutuste taseme stabiilsena hoidmisel. Kõige selle juures 
rõhutatakse fiskaalpoliitika jätkusuutlikkuse tagamise olulisust, mida on aga raske 
  348 saavutada arvestades, et võla finantseerimine vähendab sääste ja seeläbi ka 
pikaajalist majanduskasvu, mis raskendab omavahendite leidmist laenude 
tagasimaksmiseks.  
 
Sotsiaalkapitali, eriti institutsionaalse ja üldise usalduse võimalik roll fiskaalse 
tasakaalu tagamisel seisneb eelkõige selle rahvast ühendavas olemuses –  kõrge 
usalduse tase (eriti usk, et valitsus teeb parimaid otsuseid rahva heaolu huvides) 
võimaldab kergemini ellu viia vajalikke, kuigi vahel ka valulikke reforme.  
 
Empiirilised tulemused ja järeldused 
 
Töö empiirilises osas on vaatluse all aastad 2007-2010, mil langetati otsused kriisist 
väljumise poliitikate kohta ja toimus ka esialgne taastumine. Kasutatavad andmed 
pärinevad peamiselt kolmest allikast. Majandusnäitajate (eelarvedefitsiit ja avaliku 
sektori võlg, SKP tegelik ja prognoositav kasv, tööpuudus, inflatsioon) muutused on 
arvutatud Eurostati andmete alusel (vt. tabel 1). Algandmed indiviidi tasandi 
sotsiaalkapitali kohta saadi Euroopa Sotsiaaluuringu 3-5 voorust. 15-st algnäitajast 
konstrueeriti avastava faktoranalüüsi abil kolm sotsiaalkapitali faktorit 
(kogukirjeldatuse tase 60,8%, KMO=0,91): institutsionaalne usaldus, üldine usaldus 
ning rahulolu riigi majanduse ja eluga üldiselt. Lisaks sisaldas ESS 5-s küsitlusvoor 
andmeid majapidamiste toimetuleku ja tööga  seotud turvalisuse kohta 
majanduslanguse perioodil, mis koondati samuti faktoranalüüsi abil kahte 
koondnäitajasse (kogukirjeldatuse tase 57,8%). Makrotasandi sotsiaalkapitali 
lähendina kasutati kuute valitsemiskorralduse näitajat (Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 2012). Sotsiaalkapitali taseme muutusi kirjeldab tabel 2. 
 
Kokku oli empiirilises analüüsis algselt vaatluse all 27 EL liikmesriiki, kuid kuna 
osade riikide (Austria, Itaalia, Läti, Leedu, Malta, Rumeenia ja Slovakkia) kohta 
polnud võimalik leida uuemaid sotsiaalkapitali andmeid, siis on tegelik vaatluste arv 
analüüsi erinevatel etappidel erinev. Graafilise ja korrelatsioonanalüüsi tulemusena 
selgus, et fiskaalsete stiimulite rakendamine soodustas küll esialgset taastumist 
kriisist, tuues kaasa kiirema SKP ja tööhõive kasvu perioodil 2007-2010, kuid ei 
oma olulist mõju keskpika perioodi (2011-2013) kasvuprognoosile. Samal ajal leidis 
kinnitust eeldatav tugev positiivne seos fiskaalstiimulite suuruse ja riigivõla kasvu 
vahel, kusjuures viimane mõjutab omakorda negatiivselt nii praegust kui tulevast 
majanduskasvu. Need tulemused on üldjoontes kooskõlas nii teooria kui varasemate 
uurimustega, mis rõhutavad, et fiskaalsed stiimulid omavad positiivset mõju 
majandusele vaid lühiajaliselt. 
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Riik 
F
i
s
k
a
a
l
-
t
a
s
a
k
a
a
l
 
 
V
a
l
i
t
s
u
s
e
 
v
õ
l
g
 
S
K
P
 
k
a
s
v
 
2
0
0
8
-
2
0
1
0
 
S
K
P
 
k
a
s
v
u
-
p
r
o
g
n
o
o
s
 
2
0
1
1
-
2
0
1
3
 
T
ö
ö
t
u
s
 
I
n
f
l
a
t
s
i
o
o
n
 
AT  -3.5  11.6  -0.2  5.8  0  5.6 
BE  -3.8  12.1  0.4  4.7  0.8  7.2 
BG  -4.3  -0.9  0.6  7.7  3.3  21.0 
CZ  -4.1  9.7  0.9  4.3  2  8.6 
CY  -8.8  2.7  2.7  2.1  2.3  7.6 
DK  -7.4  16.2  -5.3  4.4  3.6  7.3 
EE  -2.2  3.0  -15.6  15.9  12.2  15.5 
FI  -7.8  13.1  -4.7  6.3  1.5  7.6 
FR  -4.4  18.1  -1.3  3.6  1.4  5.2 
DE  -4.5  18.0  -0.5  5.4  -1.6  4.3 
EL  -4.1  37.5  -6.9  -7.5  4.3  11.3 
HU  0.9  14.3  -4.7  3.3  3.8  17.4 
IE  -31.4  67.7  -10.2  4.6  9.1  -0.2 
IT  -3  15.3  -4.8  1.3  2.3  6.3 
LV  -7.9  35.7  -20.7  11.4  12.7  20.6 
LT  -6  21.2  -11.1  13.9  13.5  18.8 
LU  -4.8  12.4  -2.0  5.0  0.4  7.4 
MT  -1.2  6.9  4.5  5.5  0.4  9.1 
NL  -5.3  17.6  -0.1  3.6  0.9  4.3 
PL  -5.9  9.9  10.9  9.6  0  11.7 
PT  -6.7  25.0  -1.5  -3.8  3.1  3.3 
RO  -4  18.2  -1.4  7.4  0.9  23.3 
SK  -5.9  11.4  4.9  7.0  3.3  6.0 
SI  -5.8  15.7  -3.4  3.6  2.4  9.2 
ES  -11.2  24.8  -2.9  2.8  11.8  6.4 
SE  -3.4  -0.5  -0.5  7.7  2.3  7.6 
UK  -7.6  35.5  -3.5  3.0  2.5  9.8 
Allikas: Autori arvutused Eurostati andmete alusel. 
 
Sotsiaalkapitali ja fiskaaldistsipliini kohta saab analüüsi tulemuste põhjal öelda, et 
ulatuslikumad fiskaalstiimulid ja nendega seonduv väiksem elatustaseme langus on 
soodustanud nii üldise kui institutsionaalse usalduse kasvu Euroopas. Samas on 
korrelatsioonikordajad siiski madalad (alla 0,5), seega väga kindlaid järeldusi teha ei 
saa. Samuti ei õnnestunud tuvastada statistiliselt olulist seost fiskaalse tasakaalu, 
majapidamiste toimetuleku ja tööga seotud turvalisuse vahel. Makrotasandi 
  350 sotsiaalkapitali näitajate puhul olid seosed fiskaalse tasakaaluga enamasti 
negatiivsed kuid nõrgad. Tugevaimad korrelatsioonid seostusid seaduslikkuse (rule 
of law, R
2=-0,54) ja vastutavusega (voice and accountability, R
2=-0,31). 
 
Tabel 2. Sotsiaalkapitali ja valitsuskorralduse muutused riigiti perioodil 2007-2010 
Riik 
Muutused sotsiaalkapitalis, 
2008-2010 (ESS 4-5) 
Muutused valitsuskorralduses, 2007-2010 
(järjestuse muutus protsentiilides skaalal 0-100)  
Institut-
sionaalne 
usaldus 
Üldine 
usaldus 
Rahulolu 
valitsu-
sega  VA  PS  GE  RQ  RL  CC 
BE  0.072  -0.027  0.103  -0.4  0.5  1.6  -5.2  -0.4  0.6 
BG  0.570  -0.209  0.128  -5.7  -1.2  2.6  1.9  1.4  -0.2 
CZ  0.233  -0.124  -0.233  -2.6  -0.1  2.3  3.2  3.1  2.5 
CY  -0.631  0.425  -0.041  2.6  -6.4  2.1  2.6  2.6  -0.7 
DK  -0.164  0.028  -0.177  1.5  -1.7  -1.0  0.5  -1.4  0.0 
EE  0.277  0.058  0.106  2.1  0.1  2.2  1.1  -0.8  0.3 
FI  -0.146  0.060  0.013  -0.4  -5.7  1.9  5.8  1.4  -1.4 
FR  0.057  -0.080  0.032  -1.8  6.4  0.2  0.2  0.5  -2.7 
DE  -0.010  -0.007  0.119  -1.8  -9.1  -1.3  0.1  -1.4  1.1 
EL  0.307  0.677  0.510  -2.0  -23.4  -4.4  -4.0  -6.9  -10 
HU  0.867  -0.178  0.368  -7.8  -0.9  -5.9  -4.1  -4.5  -6.8 
IE  0.344  -0.490  0.341  -3.3  -7.9  -4.6  -3.8  -0.9  -0.4 
NL  0.077  0.003  0.029  -3.8  6.1  -0.4  0.5  1.5  0.5 
PL  0.283  -0.004  -0.090  8.4  14.7  6.2  7.1  7.0  9.6 
PT  -0.074  -0.049  -0.080  -5.6  -3.3  3.6  -8.4  0.6  0.7 
SI  -0.368  -0.086  -0.170  -5.5  -11.5  1.2  1.8  4.0  -5.5 
ES  -0.210  0.121  -0.167  0.7  0.3  -1.2  -2.2  2.5  -0.7 
SE  0.294  -0.108  0.347  1.0  -7.5  0.5  2.5  1.4  1.4 
UK   0.179  -0.055  0.135  -0.9  -5.9  -0.4  -1.9  1.5  -2.7 
Allikas: Autori arvutused Euroopa Sotsiaaluuringu (ESS) ja Maailma 
valitsemiskorralduse indikaatorite (Worldwide Governance Indicators 2012) alusel. 
 
Kokkuvõtvalt tuleb tõdeda, et päris selgeid ja tugevaid seoseid sotsiaalkapitali, 
fiskaaldistsipliini ja majandusarengu näitajate vahel  ei õnnestunud empiirilise 
analüüsiga saada. Põhjuseks võivad olla nii (seni veel) liialt lühikesed aegread kriisi 
tagajärgede hindamiseks kui ka riigi-  (riikide grupi) spetsiifilised tegurid, eriti 
sotsiaalkapitali osas. Ühe näitena analüüsitud seoste keerukuse kohta võib nimetada, 
et range(m) fiskaalpoliitika KIE riikides ning samaaegne ekspansiivne 
fiskaalpoliitika Lääne-Euroopa riikides võivad mõlemad kaasa tuua sotsiaalkapitali 
(eriti usalduse) kasvu, kuna elanikkonna ootused on riikide gruppides erinevad. 
Seega väärib teema veel edasist põhjalikumat riigispetsiifilist analüüsi. 
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